AMSAs are contractual relationships in which an “asset manager” undertakes to manage another party`s gas supply and supply agreements, including its pipeline capacity. In the case of a delivery AMA, a large gas buyer, for example. B a local distribution company or industrial user allocates its pipeline capacity (and possibly its gas purchase contracts) to an asset manager. WADA requires the asset manager to supply gas to the buyer when requested to do so in accordance with WADA`s terms. As there is excess capacity of pipelines or gas purchased surplus, the asset manager should maximize the value of those assets by bulk selling or freeing up pipeline capacity to third parties, with revenues shared in accordance with WADA. Delivery AMAs operate in the same way as delivery AMAs, except that a large gas vendor – most often a producer – allocates its pipeline capacity to the asset manager who buys the gas from the seller, then markets it and shares the revenues on WADA`s terms. In 2008, the Commission recognised that SAAs bring considerable benefits to market participants and took measures to facilitate the increased use of ASAs. In Regulation No 712, the Commission found that SAAs maximise the utilisation rate and value of pipeline capacity by creating a mechanism for capacity owners to use external experts to manage their capacity. The Commission found that WADA would lead to definitive savings for final consumers by reducing gas supply costs and making more efficient use of pipeline capacity. In order to allow for increased use of SAAs, Order No 712 saw the Commission exempt qualified AMSAs (those that meet certain requirements with regard to the volume of gas supply or purchase obligations imposed by the asset manager) from the tendering requirements of ferc`s rules on the release of pipeline capacity. This waiver – codified in section 284.8 of the FERC Rules – allows capacity holders to release pipeline capacity associated with an AMA to an asset manager without making the capacity available for tendering (although unlocks must continue to be made public).
Recognising that WAAs are multiple agreements, the Commission has also exempted qualified WAMAs from its ban on releasing intergovernmental pipeline capacity under foreign conditions. Finally, the Commission found that the prohibition on buying/selling operations did not prevent a party from managing its own gas purchase contracts, but that it relied on an asset manager to manage its pipeline capacity, even though, on the other hand, such agreements might involve prohibited buy/sell transactions. In its order of 15 October 2015, the Commission clarified that “buy/sell transactions in which the release shipper sells its natural gas to its asset manager as part of a delivery, the asset manager transports the gas through the freed capacity and the manager then resells the natural gas to the emitting shipper is not a purchase/sale transaction of the type prohibited by Regulation No. 636”. The Commission found that, while Regulation No 712 discussed and expressly granted an exemption from purchase/sale only for delivery AMAs, the exemption should apply to `corresponding transactions carried out in accordance with a delivery AMA`. The Commission found that buying/selling transactions related to delivery AMAs, such as delivery AMAs, do not involve circumvention of capacity release rules, as capacity continues to be used for the same purpose for which the independent shipper originally purchased AMA in supply – to place its natural gas on the market. In addition, the decommitment of capacity to the asset manager shall be transparent, both for the supply and for the provision of SAAs, in accordance with the Commission`s rules on capacity release (which do not require tenders for AMSAs but require the publication of the release). . . .